Reform of the bus sector has been occurring in many countries. One matter central to these reform initiatives is the establishment of a value for money (VM) regime to ensure that operators deliver to the market the best possible service levels consistent with stakeholder needs, and especially with the objectives of government. A key underlying feature of VM is identifying the benefit to society associated with each dollar of subsidy support from government. This paper reviews the elements of a VM regime within the setting of an incentive-based performance contract, and develops a formal framework for establishing optimum subsidy based on system-wide maximisation of social surplus. The maximisation of social surplus is subject to a number of constraints , in cluding the commercial imperative of the operator, minimum service levels under community service obligations, and a fare and subsidy budget cap. An important feature of the performance-based contract (PBC) regime is a passenger trip-based incentive payment scheme linked to user and externality benefits that incorporates a subsidy per additional passenger trip above the patronage delivered under service and fare levels compliant with community service obligation. In this way, rewards to operators are revealed through the fare box, through increased consumer surplus and through reductions in negative externalities such as those associated with the use of the car. PBCs can be designed to accommodate both the transition from an existing regime and post-transition growth strategies. The implementation of performance -based contracts is illustrated using data from private operators in the Sydney Metropolitan Area.
Introduction
Over the recent period of significant change in how bus services are supplied in many countries, a key focus has been the delivery of cost efficient services (through mixtures of privatisation, economic deregulation and competitive tendering) and finding ways to grow patronage (Hensher 2002a) . Despite all the developments to improve the cost and service efficiency of operations, something has often been shown to be lacking -the global picture -which recognises that public transport is, above all, provided through a supply chain in which more than one objective applies, such as commercial and social obligations. This more holistic approach, as presented in Hensher and Macario (2002) , recognises that no institution is able to act without affecting the other agents in the system. Social surplus maximisation (SSM) principles applied to transport tend to suffer when the focus is narrowed to the detail of cost efficient operations (the dominating focus in recent years of competitive tendering), losing to a growing extent the SSM aim associated with an overall mobility system. A big challenge is to re-focus on the integration of SSM and commercial objectives in a way that delivers much improved service levels as part 6/11/03 of what might be generically termed a value for money (VM) objective function. The holistic vision is to pursue social planning with a commitment to commercial objectives and opportunities at the operational level under a cost and service efficiency regime, thereby recognising the real meaning of optimum subsidy. This theoretical approach is not new and was articulated in the public transport context over 18 years ago by Jansson (1984) , and more recently by Jansson (2001) 1 .
As part of the many reviews of the contracting regimes that bus businesses operate within, it has been recognised that the relationship between commercial and social objectives has rarely been investigated in a systematic manner. To what extent are existing subsidy support levels optimal? What exactly does this mean? Many governments argue for the role of public transport subsidy as a way to support objectives to shift personal travel from personal automobile to bus in order to reduce external costs such as traffic congestion, crash risk and negative environmental impacts (Hensher 2002a ). Thus an important task in the review of a service delivery regime is the e stablishment of an optimum system-wide subsidy system for the provision of bus services, such that a profit maximisation level of passenger trip activity on the part of the operator will coincide with social surplus maximisation objectives. Economists, when integrating these two maximisation objectives, refer to social surplus (SS) maximisation as the sum of producer surplus (PS) (maximisation) and consumer surplus (CS) (maximisation). The former is equivalent (under a costefficiency regime) to profit maximisation for private bus operators.
One of the most innovative payment schemes designed to secure socially optimum behavioural responses from transport operators has been developed in Norway, for application in Hordaland County 2 . The local government makes payments to the bus operators through an incentive scheme that "pays for results rather than shares the costs of inputs" (Carlquist 2001) 3 . The approach identifies a set of 'external' effects that are typically not taken into account by the individual traveler when choosing a transport mode. 4 Hensher and Stanley (2002) provide more details on this scheme as well as other approaches to the establishment of performance-based contracts.
When a traveler chooses to go by car, the decision-maker typically ignores the external costs imposed on others (eg. the costs of congestion, accident risk and pollution) -assuming (as usual) that the institutional context does not allow the deployment of (first-best) car-user charges to reflect these costs. Conversely, an extra traveler who goes by bus (or other public transport) helps to create a positive external effect -often called the Mohring effect: as patronage increases on a route (or in a particular area), the (socially) optimum service frequency also increases. This benefits the new travelers (whose patronage has led to the service improvement), and also reduces trip time for those others who continue to use the service.
In the absence of practicable price discrimination, the operator is not able to extract the increase in consumer surplus that is enjoyed by the continuing users as a result of the increase in frequency -because a fare increase for all passengers would preclude some or all of the extra travel that justifies and requires 1 Jan Owen Jansson in his plenary paper at the 7 th International Conference on Competition and Ownership of Land Passenger Transport (Jansson 2001) states:
"Two main possibilities for improvement [in cost efficiency] are to stimulate competition, and to enhance the motivation and creativity of operators by introducing the profit motive into a traditional 'public service'. The question is, if the present allocative inefficiency in transport markets will be improved in the process, it is argued that these changes will not be brought about by the increased reliance on market forces. On the contrary, better planning of public transport systems, and, I dare say, continued or increased subsidization are two necessary conditions for realizing the potential improvement of the resource allocation. A complementary, significant point is, however, that there is no inevitable conflict between the ambition to increase cost efficiency in public transport, and a transport policy towards an efficient modal split." 2 An area that includes the city of Bergen as well as some surrounding rural areas. 3 Competitive tendering as implemented, in contrast, has mainly focussed on sharing the costs of inputs. 4 Although the principal modal choice in the Hordaland context is between bus and car, the competition can be generalised to include rail, ferry etc. 3 6/11/03 the extra frequency. To achieve the optimum service level, a government-funded incentive payment is needed. To the extent that the incentive payments result in lower fares and/or improved service levels, there can be social benefit from increased travel (that is, generated trips) as well as from the reduction in car travel. This too should be recognised in establishing the incentive payments.
The apparent conflict between the operator's objective function and that of SS maximisation is primarily related to the absence of the use of benchmarked best practice costing and the presence of externalities , linked to environmental (eg congestion, pollution) and social (eg equity) impacts that are not internalised in the operator's profit and loss account. If SS maximisation imposes a substantial financial loss on the operator, it would be unacceptable to the operator. If however a positive change in CS (based on private user benefits) and non-internalised externality benefits (EB) 5 would increase revenue (and conversely decrease revenue for a negative change in CS and EB), the operator would have the necessary incentive to act as a social surplus maximiser. The question then becomes one of identifying how this incentive can be provided in practice. The implementation 'solution' appears to lie in changes to the pricing (ie fare) and/or supply regulations in a way that opens up opportunities for the operator and the regulator to seek out incentive -based mechanisms that reflect the challenge to internalise CS and EB 6 . This should hopefully provide the necessary freedom and (positive) incentives for the operator to pro -actively participate in pricing policy and service design to increase cost and allocative efficiency. The benchmark for progress however is internalisation of CS and EB, achieved by the mix of internalised cost recovery and externalised funding by the provision of an optimum subsidy (or incentive-payment).
What formula will work in practice that is acceptable to both the operator and the regulator? One thing is almost certain -the re will need to be a transparent level of subsidy 7 . If a scheme is to work, however, it must prevent cost inefficiency (which can be a product of subsidy support, as indeed can poor service delivery). An effective monitoring and benchmarking program is critical 8 to ensure that cost inefficiency does not occur as the subsidy is introduced to support initiatives that deliver consumer surplus, and that external funding delivers the best value for money. Periodically reviewed benchmark best cost practice associated with specific geographical settings should be the basis of subsidy determination.
The following sections of the paper review the elements of a VM regime within the setting of an incentivebased performance contract, and develop a formal (economic) framework for establishing an optimum subsidy based on maximisation of social surplus. The maximisation of social surplus is subject to a number of constraints including the commercial imperative of the operator, minimum service levels, and a fare and subsidy budget cap. An important feature of the performance-based quality contract regime is a passengerbased incentive payment scheme, incorporating a subsidy per additional passenger trip above that competing modes such as the car. Subsidies to public transport are designed to bring its operation into line with social considerations. In particular, when car users are not charged for the negative externalities that arise from their car use, subsidies for bus services can help to encourage travelers to make appropriate choices between travel modes. Yet, when privatisation and contracting-out of bus services came into vogue in the mid-1980s, the principal aims were simply to reduce subsidies and to increase cost efficiency. In recent years, the focus has turned to the shaping of payment instruments to try to secure behavioural responses that support the specific policy purposes of the government instrumentality that pays the subsidy. 7 This is separate from any operator commitment to internal cross-subsidy between various activities that is consistent with efficiency objectives provided that avoidable costs are covered on each (well-defined) activity. 8 We recognise that monitoring of performance cannot be precise and must be dependent on trust and quality reporting (Carlquist 2001) . Such a monitoring program should focus on the three dimensions of overall performance: cost efficiency, cost effectiveness and service effectiveness. The role of constructs such as a Service Quality Index (SQI) developed by Hensher and his colleagues (eg Prioni and Hensher 2000 , Hensher and Prioni 2002 offers one way of tracking the last dimension. A referee also made excellent suggestions on the ex ante requirement for relevant information on costs and demand conditions with ex post monitoring.
6/11/03 patronage delivered under minimum service and fare levels. In this way, rewards to operators are revealed through the fare box, through increased consumer surplus and through reductions in negative externalities associated with car use. The implementation of performance-based contracts is illustrated using data collected in 2002 from private operators in the Sydney Metropolitan Area. PBCs can be designed to accommodate both transition from an existing regime and post-transition growth strategies.
Incentive-Based Performance Contracts
Before setting out the fo rmal economic framework for a proposed performance-based contract regime, we will take a closer look at a recent initiative in Norway that promotes the PBC regime over competitive tendering 9 . New performance contracts were established, in early 2000, for the three bus operators in the Hordaland county. One of these serves the urban area; the other two operate in rural areas and on the main corridors into Bergen. There is little or no on-the-road competition.
The design of the Hordaland payment mechanism is innovative. Larsen and his colleagues (Larsen 2001 , Johansen et al 2001 develop a two -stage procedure, where the first stage determines fare levels, bus revenue-km and bus capacities to maximise a social welfare function. The second stage calculates rates for fare subsidies, and for revenue-km subsidies (applicable in the peak and/or periods), that will induce a profit-maximising operator to choose the (socially) optimum levels for revenue -km and for bus capacities. The operator does not set fare levels b ut complies with maximum fare levels set by the authority. The perpassenger remuneration received by the operator is the sum of the fare level (determined in the first-stage welfare-maximising calculation) and the subsidy level (determined in the second-stage calculation).
In this approach, a per-passenger subsidy 'pays for results', and the revenue-km payment reimburses some of the costs. The operator also receives the fare revenue and both sources of revenue provide the operator with sufficient income t o balance operating costs. In other words, the revenue-km subsidy will not encourage an operator to run empty vehicles. It does encourage service frequency, and the extent of the induced increase in frequency depends on how and successfully the operator pursues profits. This is an incentive -based performance contract where the subsidy is set to match the sum of the avoided external costs of car use and the benefits of increased service frequency.
The welfare outcomes depend on the details of the implementation. The implementation of the Hordaland model is described in Carlquist (2001) 
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. Each operator has a separately calibrated contract. As in earlier contracts, these are on a net-cost basis; but unlike the Larsen (2001) model, each operator may determine the fare levels. In the event, the implemented contracts do not include any per-passenger subsidy, in part because the (global) budget constraint limited the amounts of subsidy that could be paid 11 . The Larsen 9 The evidence is drawn from Carlquist (2001) , Larsen (2001) , Johansen et al (2001) , Mills and Gale (2002) . Hensher and Stanley (2002) provide further details of the Norwegian model and the arguments for PBC compared to Competitive Tendering (CT). We recognise however that a PBC framework can also be implemented as part of a CT regime. 10 As an example of the subsidy calculation, using vehicle kilometres (VKM) as the performance criterion and $/vkm as the cost rate (RATE), with the subsidy subject to a maximum predetermined level, the subsidy in year t = (RATE*VKM t ) minus a fixed deduction as explained in Larsen (2001) . Profits are co-determined by different performance-based items -ticket revenues (I), subsidies (S), and costs (C). Ticket revenue is equal to fare (F) multiplied by demand (D), and demand is a function of VKM, fares and other service attributes. That is: profits=I+S-C, C=f(VKM), I=F*X and X=g(VKM,F,…). Given the right incentive (ie RATE) the operator will decide on a fare level and VKM at a level that maximises profits and maximises social welfare given the budgetary limits for subsidy support. The budgetary limit is often associated with a constrained social welfare maximisation rule (or Ramsey rule) that implicitly imposes a marginal cost of government funds on the calculation (ie the amount that government is willing and possibly able to contribute to the social welfare objective). 11 The global budget constraint is a very important parameter for the NSW government because it is at the heart of the Bus Reform agenda. The intent appears to be clear -to provide increased value for money within a system-wide pre-determined 6/11/03 modelling had suggested such subsidy should be paid, but only where the fare was significantly less than the marginal cost -as for peak-period rural services. The revenue-km subsidy has been implemented through two components -subsidy rates per vehicle-km and per vehicle -hour -to accommodate differences between congested urban conditions and non-congested rural operations.
The subsidy rates are calculated to secure optimum marginal conditions. In principle, there is no certainty that the total amount of subsidy will be such as to enable the operator to receive as much as, and no more than, a reasonable return on investment. Numerical calculations prepared by Larsen show that the urban operator would be likely to receive a substantial level of excess profit. This arises because the marginal cost of the peak services is very much higher than the cost of the other ('basic') services, which are a substantial part of the total offering. Accordingly, a 'fixed deduction' was suggested. Being fixed in total amount, this has no effect on the (marginal) incentive structure. Carlquist reports that the fixed-deduction principle was incorporated in the implemented contracts.
In the first year (2001) of the deployment of the new performance contracts, there has been little change especially in regard to route networks; in part because the budget constraint was tight enough to limit the scope for change, and in part (perhaps) because of inertia, including political resistance to change. Nevertheless Carlquist (2001) reported that experience with the new contracts is generally well regarded.
The Hordaland model has provided the starting position for the authors' proposal for a PBC framework for Australia. The data used to illustrate the implementation of a PBC regime has been obtained from a major private operator who is widely regarded as operating at best practice with respect to cost efficiency and effectiveness. Thus the approach detailed below is indicative of the outcomes one might anticipate under a PBC regime for an outer urban area bus operator in a major city in Australia. We focus on a PBC scheme under a transition from the existing contract regime, but show that once the transition is complete, the very same PBC scheme can be used to promote growth in passenger trips through improved service levels supported by incentive payments and possibly higher levels of subsidy support (Hensher and Houghton 2002) .
The Australian PBC Proposition
The proposed PBC framework is based on a model system that recognises the obligations of government 12 , as well as the need to provide appropriate incentives to operators to service the market in line with value for money under a tight subsidy regime. In addition, we recognise the constraints under which the regulator charged with implementing and monitoring a contract regime operates. In New South Wales (NSW), for example, a paramount requirement is for a minimum 13 administrative burden, supported by the provision of suitable data from bus operators.
The PBC framework is assumed to be implemented system-wide over a pre-defined geographical area. It can also be implemented for a single operator. We distinguish between metropolitan and non-metropolitan settings and focus herein on the metropolitan model. Furthermore, we recognise intra-metropolitan differences in the operating environment, especially due to patronage catchment, traffic congestion and maximum budget. As detailed herein PBC's can be developed for transition (holding existing subsidy levels fixed) and then later allow the subsidy level to vary as the reward for growing patronage. 12 A referee pointed out that the operator is not responsible for all actions in growing patronage and securing an acceptable return on investment. We agree with this point. As discussed in more detail in Hensher and Stanley (2002) , the regulatory regime should be focussed on providing a socially responsible environment in which operators seek to deliver cost efficient services (through careful selection of all inputs -types of vehicles, labour support etc as well as service levels (frequency, coverage, fare structure and discounts etc). 13 And certainly no increase over existing regulatory resource commitments.
time of day servicing. These differences are accommodated (to a large extent) by distinguishing between inner and outer metropolitan areas as well as peak and off-peak periods. Where minimum service levels (MSLs) are required, they will be set exogenously for each region and period based on a grading system determined, outside of the PBC structure, by a number of criteria including population, population density and incidence of school children 14 . The PBCs are assumed to have available, ex ante, relevant information on costs and demand conditions in order to calculate MSLs and fares, with the opportunity to measure, ex post, the operator's actual performance (Laffont and Tirole 1993) . This is essential in order to ensure the right incentives are operating, otherwise operators would themselves have incentives to not reveal the true information (See Pedersen 1994). All costs used will be benchmarked best practice for the specific context 15 . The use of benchmarked costs is designed to ensure that optimum subsidies are based on cost efficient service levels 16 . In addition, electronic or automated ticketing is essential to track patronage.
Defining Annual Passenger Demand
The demand for bus travel (Y) is defined as one-way annual passenger trips 17 per contract period, and is assumed to be influenced by fares (q) and service levels (X), where the latter is proxied by revenue vehicle kilometres (ie total vehicle kilometres minus dead running kilometres). Since the categories of bus passengers have differing degrees of behavioural responsiveness to changes in fares and service levels, separate passenger demand models are required for each segment. Within each geographical context, we initially propose separate demand models for peak and off-peak travel for two broad classes of travelers: (i) adults, (fare paying) children and concession travelers (ACC) and (ii) school children (S). Further segmentation can be introduced as required. There are many specifications available to represent travel demand. We have chosen equation (1) for class (i) travelers, and a separate equation (2) for class (ii) travelers, where the latter applies when school children do not pay a fare. Before the implementation of the proposed scheme (base case B), demand levels, Y B , are based on existing fares and service levels. After the implementation of the proposed scheme (Application case A), predicted demand (Y A ), is a function of a base demand (Y B ); the direct fare elasticity of demand, the direct revenue vehicle kilometre elasticity of demand; and operator responses to the scheme through changes to fares and revenue vehicle kilometres. The elasticities used in equation (1) for each of peak and off-peak activity are weighted averages across the classes of travelers within the separate demand categories.
14 Although we specify MSL in terms of a minimum amount of revenue vehicle kilometres, the regulator may wish to impose some very specific conditions on where and when these RVKM are to be provided within the contract area. This is not an issue of concern to establishing the appropriate level of incentive payment, given a system -wide subsidy budget, since all we need to know is the minimum RVKM for each of the peak and of-peak periods for each contract area. We have doubts about the benefit of imposing too rigid a service specification, as is currently the situation in NSW, because it results in many services with very little patronage and substantial cost-burdens, that do not provide real benefits to society. Spreading thin resources thinly is not a virtue that we should promote. Larsen (2001, page 2) promotes a view that "…the design of a route system is best left to an operator familiar with the area to be served". There are sensible reasons for moving, from the tactical to operator level, the fare structure, fare level, route networks and timetables, within the parameters of the incentive-driven quality contract. 15 In the Sydney context, accumulated experience with tendering (eg nightride contracts, Transitway operations) and with operators bidding in other urban areas in Australia (especially Perth and Adelaide) has provided a rich reference for best practice costs. A referee suggested that competitive tendering is an appropriate first round setting in which to establish costs to be used in subsequent rounds when practising PBCs. We support this where the incumbent is a public operator or a poorly performing incumbent ; however in the Australian context we have observed that after the initial CT rounds, the gains in cost efficiency are quite marginal as long as the incumbent operator continues to operate at contract costs (see Bray 2002) . 16 If there is a case for differences in cost efficient rates (for whatever reason, such as an equity-adjustment), this can be included. 17 A passenger trip is defined as a single one-way trip from an origin to a destination. If a transfer between buses is required this is not two passenger trips.
We initially assume a static representation, with annual patronage response assumed to occur at t he specified rate over the period of a contract. For class (i) travelers, the fare elasticities are respectively -0.20 and -0.45 for the peak and off-peak periods, and the service (RVKM) elasticities are 0.33 and 0.63. For class (ii) travelers, the service elasticities are assumed to be the same as class (i), on the assumption that the parent traveler decides on the school child's modal activity.
The PBC system requires a base prediction of patronage associated with minimum service levels 18 . To obtain this patronage, we use the level of RVKM associated with the MSL, and impose a fare level unchanged from case B. The resulting MSL patronage for class (i) travelers is Y B as shown in equation (3) for the ACC segment.
In what follows
, Y MSL will be used in place of()
Defining Annual Total Cost
Benchmark cost efficiency is formalized by a set of total annual cost equations (4) for each period and region. Total predicted cost (C) is defined as a function of benchmarked base cost (calculated from best practice total cost per kilometre); predicted responses in total vehicle kilometres (VKM) (including dead running kilometres), predicted changes in total passenger demand (from equations 1 and 2), predicted responses in total seat capacity per revenue vehicle kilometre; and the respective set of cost elasticities for VKM, patronage and bus capacity. VKM is the sum of revenue and dead running kilometers, with the default val ue in our empirical example for dead running VKM set equal to12.5% of VKM for both peak and off-peak activity. That is, VKM = 1.1258RVKM. Bus capacity, defined by seating and standing capacity per bus multiplied by the number of buses, impacts on passenger demand through revenue vehicle kilometres and a service quality constraint that indicates how much bus capacity must be provided to satisfy passenger trip demand. This then translates into vehicle kilometers, which impacts on total annual cost, taking into account the annualized cost of bus capital. The starting passenger trip-demand elasticities with respect to cost are respectively -0.32 and -0.20 for the peak and off-peak periods. The equivalent service (RVKM) elasticities are 0.76 and 1.20. The equivalent fleet size elasticity, derived from increased capital charges and applied only to peak periods, is 0.19. The separate cost equation for peak and off-peak periods, for each region and period, has the form of equation (4). 
Defining the Constraints
There are a number of constraints that enable us to represent the environment in which the delivery of services satisfies all stakeholders. The key constraints are shown below.
Fare Cap
A fare cap (5) over the contract period for each peak/off-peak period and region is a political reality in most jurisdictions, and in Australia (maximum) fares typically may not increase by more than the consumer price index. The introduction of PBCs must comply with this condition, set herein as a 5% maximum increase per annum. This can be adjusted to suit the political setting.
Vehicle Kilometres (VKM)
A condition of public transport service delivery often included in contracts is that there is a minimum level of service that must be provided under community service obligations (CSO) at cost efficient levels. These service levels are determined by external criteria set by government such as a requirement to provide a minimum amount of vehicle kilometres depending on the socio -economic and demographic profile of the region to be served. This profile must be defined by an agreed set of criteria, such as total resident population, population density, the percentage of total population that are school children, and availability of other modes (eg a train service) (see Ton and Hensher 1997) . On the basis of a we ighted system for each criterion, a minimum amount of RVKM is required for each period and region. The precise geographical allocation of this MSL is a detail of specific contract compliance, and does not impact on the determination of the optimal social solution. This minimum RVKM would ideally be an absolute amount; but for the present application we define it as 67% of current service VKM's 19 . Equation (6) defines the minimum level of service. A total cost per kilometre can be introduced to convert this MSL to a dollar commitment from government.
The proportion of the total subsidy budget (TB) allocated to performance-based contracts in the regulator's scheme is denoted by R, which permits variations in the structure of the subsidy scheme between MSL and above-MSL (or PBC) components. Since TB is the pure -MSL subsidy requirement, as determined by the CSO, the MSL of a given scheme is defined by the associated R value as CSO*(1-R) 20 . The inclusion of R enables us to assess the implications of various mixe s of MSL and PBC service levels.
In addition to the fare cap and MSL constraints, government typically has a limited budget to allocate to subsidy support for bus transport. This subsidy cap is assumed to be a system-wide constraint within the metropolitan area and applies to all inner and outer metropolitan bus operators 21 . The subsidy cap is 6/11/03 exogenously given but adjustable by government decree and has to fund the CSO payments as well as payments directly linked to incentives for growing patronage. The passenger-based incentive payment scheme at the heart of PBC's is made up of gains in consumer surplus and externality benefits, where the latter are primarily linked to reductions in traffic congestion due to reductions in car VKMs (see section 3.5.2). For every additional passenger trip above predicted patronage, based on RVKM MSL and associated fares, the operator has the opportunity to secure revenue from three sources: (i) the fare box (ii) the change in consumer surplus as a measure of user benefit and (iii) the change in externality cost from reduced car use. The last two revenue streams are referred to as incentive payments and are part of the total budget commitment to the system as a whole by government. After committing CSO payments, the balance of the total subsidy budget is available for such incentive payments (constraint (6)). While this residual amount is fixed, the estimate of its dollar value per passenger trip of the consumer surplus benefit will be determined by the maximisation of the social surplus function subject to the set of constraints. The dollar unit values of reductions in car VKM are exogenously supplied based on studies of the externality cost of car use (see Bus Industry Confederation 2001 and Sansom et al 2002) . If additional passenger trip growth over the predicted amount per contract period is exceeded, it cannot be funded out of the available incentive payments unless government revises its total subsidy budget. Nonetheless, all additional fare revenue will be accrued by the operators.
Traffic and capacity
In peak and off peak periods, the road traffic in which buses operate is vastly different, and to achieve a given RVKM in dense traffic requires the deployment of more buses compared to light traffic conditions. , for a given solution X A . Z is not a control parameter but simply reflects the traffic of the period in the base case.
Imposing equivalent traffic conditions in equivalent periods (peak, off-peak) to the base case requires
where # bus = the number of buses assigned to the period/region and Pers = bus capacity (seating + standing).
#bus is assumed to reflect the demand levels of the base period and may be changed with corresponding cost implications. The capital cost of extra buses is fixed to # bus unless included with Z. Pers is assumed to be single -valued and unchanging. From (7) the capacity required for a given solution X A is given by AB XZ.
The number of buses may be increased or decreased to provide an upper bound to X A that is fixed by the number of buses assigned to the period, i.e.
(.#)
operators. In addition, government may wish to pre-assign a cap to each operator (which we would recommend in the transition phase but not in post-transition growth phase).
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For a given #bus value, the bound may be loosened by reducing service quality, as discussed above.
Service quality
Service quality is maintained through the service quality constraint, which in its fundamental form requires
This becomes very restrictive for low X solutions, since with X A decreasing from X B towards X MSL , Y A declines towards Y MSL 22 , more slowly than X A is declining. At low service levels, however, it is realistic to allow a decline in service quality to reflect an interaction between the declining returns and declining price elasticity of demand as the volume of business declines. In general, it is important to loosen the form of (9) through a control variable,κ, which relates to how full the buses are allowed to be on average, given normal operating practices. κ is a measure of service quality with respect to loading and allows the service level to slip. The less restrictive form of (9) is given in (10)
The starting value of κ is
which measures the base trip -rate per unit carrying capacity allocated. κ can be adjusted up or down to control an increase or decrease in acceptable bus crowding levels, thereby providing decreased or increased service quality (loading). Where increased κ is not associated with a reduced volume of business, it should result in increased costs to reflect a loss of goodwill. Solutions incorporating increased values of κ will define an environment within which operators may make normal profits whilst providing high social surplus solutions. As in the previous section, optimum operator strategies may take the industry in different directions.
System Wide Constraints
There are two system-wide constraints associated with all regional activity.
Subsidy cap
First we have the total subsidy cap (11) in which the amount of subsidy available for passenger incentive payments is less than or equal to the total allocated subsidy budget minus commitments to CSO payments.
( ) 44 region, periodregion, period
Constraint (11) states that the patronage incentive must be less than or equal to the subsidy budget above CSO payments for all operators for (CS+EB)>0. Performance-based contracts allow subsidy payments to be earned whenever (CS+EB) is positive. Negative payments are not part of the performance -based system and are excluded in the modelling. Since both CS and EB are measured from the MSL position, payments are excluded when (CS+EB)<0. Although the total CS + EB is realized to the benefit of the community , the regulator can exercise the option to pay all of the benefit to the operator or only a proportion. P is the payout rate, defining the proportion of external benefits accrued by bus companies on achieved (CS+EB). This is an important issue since the incentive payment focus does not suggest that 100% of the benefit must be paid to the operator. Indeed distribution of the full social benefit to the operator may not be equitable and/or financially feasible. What is critical however, is that the payment distribution ensures sufficient incentive for the operator to improve service levels in order to grow patronage.
Commercial requirements
Total cost, including an acceptable return on investment, to all operators delivering bus services must be covered by all sources of revenue (12). The commercial constraint (equation 12) requiring that operator costs do not exceed revenues may be implemented when only commercially viable solutions are considered. 
Defining the Objective Function
The demand and cost models together with the constraint set condition the maximum value of the social surplus objective function, given in (13) (13) Consumer surplus and externality benefit are calculated above YMSL. The measure of consumer surplus is relatively complex and influenced by changes in demand.
Defining the Benefit Sources

Consumer surplus
The minimum service level, MSL, corresponds to the CSO, and is defined by a minimum RVKM, (X MSL ), and maximum fare charged under MSL (typically the maximum permissible fare). The corresponding patronage level, Y MSL , is established from equation (1). Y MSL establishes the base patronage above which consumer surplus is generated, given the current subsidy scheme. We let CS denote the level of consumer surplus associated with patronage determined by X MSL and maximum fares.
A composite demand variable, G, is defined as a function of both fare level and RVKM. G MSL is determined equivalently to Y MSL . The quantity demanded (ie patronage) is related to bus travel attributes, some of which are desirable to the consumer, like RVKM, and others which are undesirable, like price. These attributes may be combined in a composite attribute measure, G, where
k = -1, and λ = Community preparedness-to-pay for a 1 km increase in X.
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Deriving lambda is a challenge given the absence of empirical studies. However additional service levels can be approximated by improved service frequency. The TRESIS project (Hensher 2002 ) suggests a willingness to pay for improvements in service frequency of $2.66 per passenger trip hour. Given an average speed in the peak period of 24 kph and an off-peak average speed of 30 kph, we can convert the frequency valuation into $0.11 per RVKM in the peak and $0.0886 per RVKM in the off-peak for class (i) travelers. For class (ii) travelers the rates are halved.
A corresponding composite demand function gives Y A as a function of G A etc., and consumer surplus is then measured as equation (15). Given that increases in fares reduce CS and increases in RVKM increase CS, we have to be careful how we treat the two impacts in the determination of changes in consumer surplus. Effective demand results from a balance between q and X. For given parameter values, k and λ, the slope of the composite demand function will be positive or negative depending on solution values, q A and X A . When the slope is negative, as shown in Figure A, Figure B , a consumer surplus, ABC, is derived from an increase in the composite trip attribute from G MSL to G A .
In both Figures A and B , consumer surplus derives from ABC, but this is supplemented by the addition of (G 
MSL -G
A )(Y MSL ) in
Externality Benefit
The change in externality benefits associated with car use is defined by equation (16). We assume initially that on average every car trip switched to a bus trip reduces car use by 10 kilometres and that 40% (20%) of all switched trips by adults (by school, children) are from car 24 . Any transfer of car trips to bus trips reduces road traffic congestion and creates an externality benefit which also contributes to social surplus. EB denotes the externality benefit generated by solution trips above Y MSL and is directly comparable to CS. EB = $/(↓car user)*(↑passengers from car) … for each region, period = ($/VKM car )*(av VKM car ) *(↑passengers from car)
The unit rate of externality benefit per VKM traveled by class (i) travelers, is a composite sum of six externalities, summarize d in Table 1 for peak and off-peak and inner and outer metropolitan contexts. The evidence is drawn from the Bus Industry Confederation (2001) submission to the Commonwealth fuel tax inquiry. It is broadly consistent with the UK evidence reported in Sansom et al (2002) . These unit rates do not take into account any marginal impacts associated with additional bus travel required to accommodate additional passengers. They are strictly car-related values 25 . The patronage incentive is the sum of CS and EB (in dollars) 26 . Importantly, although school children travel for free in most jurisdictions and the operators are compensated through CSO payments, additional trips by children will attract an incentive payment through increased consumer surplus, and for car switchers, through increased externality benefit. On the latter calculation we may have to impose an additional assumption as to whether the school child's bus use results in a reduction in car VKM or not, since some trips may continue. 24 This assumption can be refined by an assessment of source of switchers in the first monitoring period of if othe r evidence is available. 25 Where the growth in bus patronage impacts noticeably on levels of road damage, congestion etc, the incremental external costs should be set off against the benefits from reduced car use. The comments of a referee are appreciated. A referee also suggested adding parking subsidies as an external cost. While there is merit in considering this, despite some views that it is bundled with private transactions and borne by businesses, parking is not an issue in the context on the outer-urban application in Sydney. It would be for inner-urban applications. 26 EB may be negative if passenger trips fall and they switch to car, although we are not proposing to tax the operator.
6/11/03
A Case Study for the Outer Metropolitan Area of Sydney
The formal economic optimisation framework presented in section 3 has been tested on operators in the outer areas of the Sydney metropolitan area. Drawing on data collected in 2002 by the Institute of Transport Studies (ITS), in cooperation with 12 private bus operators 27 , we have extracted the relevant data for the model system. Importantly, the amount of data required from operators is relatively small and manageable for the regulatory task. Benchmark costs are those of the most cost efficient operator in the set Exogenous indicators such as elasticities, unit externality cost rates, willingness to pay parameters, minimum service level VKM etc are provided from non-operator sources, and can be modified as new information becomes available. We have selected what are regarded as best-knowledge estimates in this case study to illustrate the feasibility and appeal of the analytical relationships used to establish appropriate incentive payments for PBCs under a social surplus maximisation subsidy scheme. In the current paper we focus on the transition-phase of introducing PBCs and set the subsidy budget to the existing operatorspecific level. In a follow-up paper, Hensher and Houghton (2002) generalise the approach to optimise the total subsidy budget under a 'growth after transition' schema.
The budget and %MSL in Scenario I
The current subsidy level for the operator is TB = $7,304,306. It is determined exogenously in part to accommodate the demographics of the region and availability of other modes. The case study operator advises that TB meets costs for %MSL of around 67% of annual route VKM.
28 Best practice total costs per kilometre ($VKM) in the Sydney bus sector for 2002 are estimated at $2.60 in peak and $2.30 in off-peak periods. However, the subsidized kilometres generate fare revenue at current rates of $0.80 per VKM in the peak and $0.65 per VKM in the off-peak. This revenue is retained by the operators and gives a net cost per kilometre of $1.80 in the peak and $1.65 in the off-peak. Using the net cost rates, the specified subsidy meets 76.9% of VKM -compared to the operator's estimate of around 67%. It is clear that the current subsidy regime will leave a surplus above the requirements for %MSL=67%, and this is assumed to be made available as incentive payments for (CS+EB). This subsidy environment is defined as Scenario I, and is regarded as the base case for further scenarios presented in Hensher and Houghton (2002) .
The subsidy regime for the scenario is summarized in Table 2 . The components of X(MSL), from (6), are 1,385,974 kilometres for the peak and 2,342,948 kilometres for the off-peak periods. Applying the net cost/km produces an MSL subsidy cost of $6,360,617. The balance of the subsidy budget, $943,689, is assumed to be made available as incentive payments for (CS+EB). Scenario I is, therefore, a 12.92% performance based regime. Parameter settings to accommodate Scenario I are TB = 7,304,306, %MSL = 0.67, and R=0. For later scenarios, R may be set to a percentage subsidy restructuring from MSL to PBC as compared to the base case. 27 We used the data from 12 operators to confirm benchmark best cost practice and then used other data from this operator as if they were the system-wide provider. This paper does not assume anything about the optimum number of contract areas or operators. This issue is detailed in Hensher (2002b) . 28 Establishing the correct %MSL in the transition period is crucial. It determines the $CSO commitment and hence the residual TB available for incentive payments.
6/11/03 MSL kms using %MSL=0.67 in (6) The model is optimized over P, the payout rate on (CS+EB) above the MSL level, in order to strike a parity between the existing scheme and the 12.92%PBC scheme of Scenario I. The Scenario I solution is shown in Table 3 , where the operator's return is -9.60%. Such a return on investment is clearly unacceptable to a commercial operator. What we have revealed in the base case analysis is that this bus business (and we suspect most urban operators in Sydney) operating under the NSW 1990 Passenger Transport Act (and revisions) is not commercially viable without support from other sources. When the route operations are supplemented by returns on charter operations, the overall rate of return is 7%, as shown in Table 4 , where RORI denotes the rate of return on total cost Importantly, it must be noted that the costs 'allocated' to the charter operations are based on marginal costs of these additional services, and so we are comparing the minimum cost assumption with fully allocated charter revenue. It is possible to improve on the -9.6% return on investment by using average costing (pro rated by VKM); however the result will still be negative. The social benefit above MSL is (CS+EB) = $6,490,519. The optimum payout rate is 14.5%, which specifies the percentage payout on (CS+EB) generated above X(MSL), and indicates that the social benefit generated under the current regime, in terms of consumer surplus and externality benefit, is 6.88 times the effective incentive payments. In summary, an extra $6.5 million social benefit above MSL is generated by the operators in response to a PBC component of around a million dollars . Under Scenario I, this is realised by bus operators as P*(CS+EB) where P is 14.5% which translates to average PBC payments of, $1.21 for consumer surplus and 17 cents for externality benefit per passenger trip above MSL.
Fleet size under Scenario I
In this section, the operator strategy parameters are extended to include fleet expansion as well as X and q. The subsidy regime of Scenario I is maintained, where regulator parameters TB, $CSO, and P are fixed.. The fleet size is the number of buses required for route services, and in the base period this is 76 buses. It does not include any capacity cushion required for maintenance, breakdowns and charter services. Increases above 76 may be imp lemented through the integer variable dbus, which introduces capital costs as earlier described. Extra buses introduced through dbus are available to both peak and off-peak periods, and the adjusted fleet size is given by (76+dbus). The optimum extended strategy is shown in Table 5 , where dbus is seen to be 2, increasing the fleet size to 78. Given the fixed subsidy level, incentive payments (CS+EB) cannot be increased above (TB-$CSO). The operator is, therefore, seen in Table 5 to use the extra two vehicles to increase peak services, Y P , while correspondingly reducing the less remunerative service level to off-peak periods, Y OP . The overall service level is decreased, but the MSL is still met, external benefits above the MSL are unchanged and, the social surplus is improved through the producer surplus.
Social surplus returns on the invested subsidy TB are denoted by %SS, and operators returns on total costs by %PS. The behaviour of %SS and %PS are shown in Figure C , which demonstrates the mutually supportive property of operator and regulator optimisation that may be achieved by introducing a performance-based component to a subsidy regime. As a result, operator strategy optimisation can be expected to achieve desirable social outcomes, relieving the regulator from onerous industry control obligations in pursuit of the social surplus. 
%SS
%PS
%SS
The returns to the regulator and the operator in the absence of a PBC component are shown in Figure D , where the PBC component is replaced by a financially equivalent addition to the MSL component. In Figure D , increasing dbus within a fixed subsidy regime, is seen to provide increasing social returns, but at the expense of operator returns. The absence of a PBC component allows the service level delivered to be increased without operator reward and without regard to consequent increasing operator losses. The operator and regulator are clearly in antagonistic positions. It is clear from Figure D , that no expansion would be pursued by the regulator and, what appears to be an attractive social surplus potential is unachievable outside a fully controlled bus industry.
The contrast between Figure C and Figure D is stark and it is clear that a PBC component has introduced a level of harmony between operator and regulator, according to which the operator preference is to move in the direction of regulator preference. 
Conclusions and Future Research Directions
Performance-based contracts (PBCs) have emerged as a practical contracting regime with many virtues. Under a transparent partnership between the regulator and the service provider, a PBC offers a most effective way of delivering transport services, ensuring over time that the allocation of subsid ies is determined optimally from a system-wide perspective, not on an individual contract by individual contract basis (as would be required under other contracting regimes) 29 .
The proposed system of subsidy which brings profit maximisation on the part of operators into harmony with social surplus maximisation, appears to offer a very attractive contract regime. Nash and Jansson (2002) in reviewing alternative reform schemes introduced over the last 15 years, conclude that "the regulatory phase could be better managed this time round, with an emphasis on 'light touch' regulation, perhaps combined with the appropriate use of subsidies per passenger kilometre and infrastructure charges to incentivise the franchisee to provide the socially optimum fares/service combination'. This is the intent of PBCs both in transition and post-transition.
The method deve loped and implemented in this paper is sufficiently flexible to be applicable under a large number of regulatory and operating regimes. For example, it is feasible to consider alternative fare increase caps, different aggregate subsidy budget levels (be they increments or decrements on existing levels), variations in the balance of minimum-service levels and incentive payment rates for environmental benefits, and acceptable commercial returns. The ability to recognise the full extent of consumer (ie user) surplus benefits to society and to determine the amount that might reasonably be paid to operators to ensure that the returns are incentive-compatible, without delivering unacceptable high rates of return to operators from the provision of public funds, is a very appealing feature of the approach.
The model developed herein has been implemented for the benchmark (in terms of cost efficiency) operator in a setting where there is potential patronage growth. However in a transition to a full PBC structure, some operators will begin with cost structures that deviate from benchmark best practice as well as having varying degrees of patronage growth potential in their service area (including the extreme of almost no opportunity to grow patronage simply because the market is so thin). In ongoing research, Hensher and Houghton (2002) have investigated transition settings with mixtures of cost performance and patronage growth potential.
Hensher and Houghton (2002) also recognise that the PBC framework developed herein can be extended beyond the transition stage, to encourage growth from transition, and to establish the social surplus maximisation solution under an unconstrained subsidy budget. This stage of growth after transition will 29 There is growing concern in England that concessionary fare subsidies are not matched by appropriate 'deliverable and measurable outputs' (DLTR 2002) . The Director -General of the Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive stated in a submission to the House of Commons Transport Select Committee's inquiry on the bus industry that "We would like to reach a point where all the money paid to the bus industry is linked in some way to outputs'. The most interesting feature of the reform proposal is, over a 3-5 year period, to transfer some or all of the concessionary fares budget into a central pot. Operators would then be asked to come forward with proposals for delivering a network of commercial and supported services determined by the central authority and 10 metropolitan governments. This has been described as 'voluntary quality contracts' that push at the limits of quality partnerships but which is necessary to improve the increasingly poor quality of service levels of bus provision (which has evolved out of economic deregulation and competitive tendering of non-commercial services).
6/11/03 consolidate the fuller extent of value for money under a PBC regime. The transition stage however is crucial in an environment where established operators have demonstrated (to varying degrees) the ability to deliver service quality. The transition to an incentive-compatible contract scheme should ensure greater gains to society in the future which may have been denied by the existing contract regime 30 . Future research will develop decision rules for applying the scheme in new regions.
